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Abstract. Current web service platforms (WSPs) often perform all web services-
related processing, including security-sensitive information handling, in the same 
protection domain. Consequently, the entire WSP may have access to security-
sensitive information such as credit card numbers, forcing us to trust a large and 
complex piece of software. To address this problem, we propose ISO-WSP, a new 
middleware architecture that decomposes current WSPs into two parts executing in 
separate protection domains: (1) a small trusted T-WSP to handle security-sensitive 
data, and (2) a large, legacy untrusted U-WSP that provides the normal WSP func-
tionality, but uses the T-WSP for security-sensitive data handling. By restricting se-
curity-sensitive data access to T-WSP, ISO-WSP reduces the software complexity of 
trusted code, thereby improving the testability of ISO-WSP. To achieve end-to-end 
security, the application code is also decomposed into two parts, isolating a small 
trusted part from the remaining untrusted code. The trusted part encapsulates all ac-
cesses to security-sensitive data through a Secure Functional Interface (SFI).  To 
ease the migration of legacy applications to ISO-WSP, we developed tools to trans-
late direct manipulations of security-sensitive data by the untrusted part into SFI in-
vocations. Using a prototype implementation based on the Apache Axis2 WSP, we 
show that ISO-WSP reduces software complexity of trusted components by a factor 
of five, while incurring a modest performance overhead of few milliseconds per re-
quest. We also show that existing applications can be migrated to run on ISO-WSP 
with minimal effort: a few tens of lines of new and modified code. 
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1. Introduction 
Service-Oriented Computing (more recently also referred to as “service computing”) is 
designed to support rapid creation of new, value-added applications and business proc-
esses that can span diverse organizations and computing platforms. Concretely, Paypal’s 
Web Services, eBay Developer Program and Amazon Web Services are illustrative exam-
ples of web services being used in mission-critical, security-sensitive, and truly large scale 
applications.  Despite the widespread deployment of web services, however, significant 
research challenges remain.  This paper is concerned with the protection of security-
sensitive information in service computing. 
Web Service Platforms (WSPs) such as Apache Axis2, Microsoft .NET and IBM 
WebSphere provide essential functionality such as SOAP messaging and support for pub-
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lishing and discovering web services. Additionally, WSPs provide desirable functionality 
such as support for web service composition, atomicity and message reliability. Support 
for such large and varied functionality has increased the size and complexity of current 
WSPs; for example, the open source Axis2 WSP and its extensions account for over 
110,000 lines of code (LOC).  
Current WSPs often perform all types of processing, including security-sensitive infor-
mation handling, in the same protection domain. Therefore, all components of the WSP 
may have direct or indirect access to sensitive data, violating the Principle of Least Privi-
lege [23]. Additionally, the large size and complexity of WSPs hinders their testability, 
resulting in systems with multiple security vulnerabilities [6,7]. Therefore, even though 
security-sensitive applications employ protocols such as SSL, TLS and WS-Security, at-
tackers can compromise the flow of sensitive information by exploiting vulnerabilities in 
the large WSPs. 
We propose ISO-WSP, a middleware architecture for web services to address the prob-
lem of protecting security-sensitive information flow against potential vulnerabilities in-
herent in large and complex software packages such as WSPs. Applying the AppCore ap-
proach [24], ISO-WSP decomposes current WSPs into two parts: a small, functionally-
limited, trusted T-WSP and a large, functionally-rich, untrusted U-WSP. The T-WSP con-
sists of components of a WSP that require access to security-sensitive information and the 
U-WSP contains the rest of the legacy WSP. The T-WSP and U-WSP are executed in 
separate protection domains, with the U-WSP invoking the T-WSP when it has to operate 
on security-sensitive data. By restricting security-sensitive data access to the small T-
WSP, ISO-WSP eliminates the need to trust the U-WSP. Since the T-WSP is expected to 
be considerably smaller than the U-WSP, we improve the testability of the ISO-WSP.  
To achieve end-to-end security, the AppCore approach also splits the application code 
into two parts, isolating a small trusted part from the remaining untrusted code. The trusted 
part encapsulates all accesses to security-sensitive data through a Secure Functional Inter-
face (SFI). The untrusted part of the application is forced to use this interface if it wants to 
operate on security-sensitive data. To ease the migration of legacy applications to ISO-
WSP, we developed tools to translate direct manipulations of security-sensitive data into 
SFI invocations, eliminating all access to security-sensitive data by the untrusted part.   
We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by implementing and evaluating an 
ISO-WSP based on the Axis2 WSP. We show that ISO-WSP results in a five-fold reduc-
tion in the size and complexity of the software that has access to sensitive data, while im-
posing a moderate overhead of few milliseconds per request. We also show that existing 
applications can be ported to ISO-WSP by adding or modifying few tens of lines of code. 
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 motivates the paper by 
first presenting the design of WSPs in detail and then discussing the security problems in 
current WSPs. Section 3 discusses the design of ISO-WSP and Section 4 discusses appli-
cation-level support for the ISO-WSP architecture. Section 5 describes an implementation 
of the ISO-WSP architecture based on the Axis2 WSP and evaluates the resulting system. 
Section 6 discusses the related work and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2. Motivation 
We first discuss the framework for web service platforms (WSPs) as specified by W3C. 
For concreteness, we also present the design of the Axis2 WSP, one specific implementa-
tion of the web services framework. Based on this knowledge, we discuss the security 
problems in current WSPs. For clarity we present definitions for the terms used in this 
paper: 
• Confidentiality: Only authorized entities have access to data. 
• Integrity: Only authorized entities are allowed to modify data and any modification by 
unauthorized entities can be detected. 
• Security-sensitive (or) Sensitive data item: Any data item that the end-user or the busi-
ness logic imposes confidentiality or integrity requirements is termed as security-
sensitive, e.g., payment information, patient health information. Sensitive data items 
also include data items that may not be transmitted over the network, e.g., private keys 
used by the WSP. 
2.1 Design of Web Service Platforms 
W3C’s web services architecture specification [9] specifies the basic framework for 
WSPs. WSPs such as Apache Axis2 and Microsoft .NET implement this framework. The 
framework consists of three entities: a service provider, a client and a web service discov-
ery agency. A WSP is used to mediate interactions between the three entities and this re-
quires support for three basic classes of functionality: exchanging messages, describing 
web services and publishing and discovering web service descriptions. Since this paper 
addresses the security of information exchanges between the service provider and the cli-
ent, we focus on the first class of functionality: support for message exchanges.  
Fig. 1 presents one view of the web services stack, as illustrated in W3C’s specification 
[9]. All WSPs must implement a transport protocol, typically HTTP, and provide support 
for a message packaging mechanism, typically SOAP. The WSPs might also choose to 
support additional message packaging and transport mechanisms such as MIME over 
SMTP. In addition to the basic features, the WSP must also support functionality such as 
routing, transaction support, message reliability, security and quality of service. W3C has 
also standardized many types of additional functionality in the form of WS-* extensions 
such as WS-Addressing, WS-Security amongst others. Table 1 lists some of the WS-* 
extensions and briefly describes the functionality of each type of extension. WSPs may 
also possess an extension architecture to seamlessly integrate new and upcoming WS-* 
specifications or to provide support for custom extensions for logging or load-balancing. 
The Apache Axis2 WSP [20] is one implementation of the web services framework. We 
use the Axis2 WSP in our analysis as not only is it widely used, it is also available under 
an open source license, enabling us to gain a clearer understanding of its workings. Axis2 
provides support for developing, deploying, managing and invoking web services. Addi-
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tionally, Axis2 also provides support for utilizing many WS-* extensions such as WS-
Security and WS-ReliableMessaging. As we are primarily interested in the processing of 
web service requests and responses, we focus on the SOAP processing model of Axis2 [2]. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the SOAP processing chain for a web service request or response in the 
Axis2 WSP. Axis2 handles all message interactions using two basic message handling 
sequences: In Pipe and Out Pipe for incoming and outgoing messages respectively. As the 
basic structure of both sequences is similar, we use the In Pipe as an illustrative example. 
An incoming web service request is first received by the Transport Listener. The Trans-
port Listener creates a message context and starts the In Pipe, which consists of a series of 
handlers. First, the transport handlers are used to verify transport protocol headers and 
populate the message context with data from the message. Next, handlers are used to proc-
ess addressing headers and determine the target service. After this, user specified handlers 
are executed to perform tasks such as security processing, transaction support or reliable 
messaging support. Finally, the message is deserialized into language level objects and 
given to the web service implementation, which executes the business logic. 
Axis2 uses handlers to implement and support various types of optional functionalities. 
For example, handlers are used to support many of the WS-* extensions like WS-Security 
Table 1. List of some WS-* extensions and the functionality provided by each of them [4] 
Extensions Functionality 
WS-Addressing Provides a uniform naming scheme to address end-points. 
WS-Security, WS-Trust,  
WS-SecureConversation, ... 
Securing messages and establishing trust across different domains. 
WS-AtomicTransaction,  
WS-Coordination, ... 
Transaction Support for web services. 
WS-ReliableMessaging 
Support for reliable delivery of messages over non-reliable commu-
nication channels. 
WSDL, WS-Policy, ... 
Support for description and exchange of metadata between clients 
and service providers. 
WS-Eventing Event-driven programming support for web services 
 
 
Fig. 1. Web Services Stack. From W3C's Web 
Services Architecture specification [9]. 
 




and WS-Addressing. Additionally, Axis2 allows for custom handlers to perform web ser-
vice-specific, non-standard tasks such as admission control, load balancing or logging. 
2.2 Security Problems in Web Service Platforms 
The WS-Security specification [5] was designed to protect the confidentiality and integrity 
of information flow in web services. However, WS-Security-based protection can be by-
passed by exploiting vulnerabilities in endpoint software. On the server side, attackers can 
compromise information flow by exploiting vulnerabilities in server software: operating 
system, web server, WSPs [6,7], or the business logic and its support software (e.g., data-
base software). Similarly, on the client side, attackers can leverage vulnerabilities in client-
side WSPs or client applications like the browser. We focus on securing WSPs in this pa-
per. Securing operating systems, support software and applications such as the browser is 
outside the scope of this paper. 
From a security perspective, WSP implementations have two significant issues. First, at 
the component level, WSPs violate the principle of least privilege (PoLP). PoLP states that 
components should execute with the least set of privileges necessary to finish the job. 
WSPs contain many components that do not need access to sensitive data, e.g., transport 
protocol implementation and WS-* extensions such as WS-Addressing. However, all these 
components execute in the same address space and same protection domain. Hence they 
can either directly access security-sensitive data or modify WS-Security processing by 
modifying security processing parameters and compromise security-sensitive data. 
Concretely, in the Axis2 WSP, all handlers execute in the same protection domain as 
the rest of the WSP and the application-level code. Therefore, handlers that do not require 
access to sensitive data get access directly (reading message contents) or indirectly. For 
example, all Axis2 handlers for a given service have access to the service context that con-
tains WS-Security processing parameters. Therefore, misbehaving handlers, even those 
that operate on encrypted data can compromise information flow by changing WS-
Security processing parameters, e.g., by specifying the use of a weak encryption key. 
Secondly, a WSP is a complex piece of software. As seen earlier (§ 2.1), WSPs are ex-
pected to perform a large number of tasks. Unsurprisingly, they contain large code bases. 
Additionally, since WSPs have to be configurable and extensible, they also typically pos-
sess configuration files, an extension-architecture and multiple extensions. Concretely, the 
Axis2 WSP alone contains about 23.5 KLOC. Together with the implementations of the 
multiple WS-* specifications, the WSP contains over 110 KLOC. Additionally, program-
mers can write custom handlers to carry out other types of processing like load balancing 
or admission control. These components add to the complexity of the system. Given the 
large code base and the multitude of ways in which these components can interact with 
each other, it is not feasible to exhaustively test the components of the WSP, especially as 
a complete system, and eliminate all vulnerabilities. Moreover, the configurable nature of 
WSPs means that extensions can be added, enabled and disabled at runtime, further com-
plicating the analysis and testing of WSPs. 
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3. ISO-WSP 
To address the security problems discussed in Section 2.2, we present a new secure mid-
dleware architecture for Web Services. The architecture, called ISO-WSP, splits the WSP 
into two parts: a small trusted T-WSP and a legacy, untrusted U-WSP. The T-WSP con-
sists of components that require access to plain-text sensitive data. The U-WSP contains 
rest of the functionality of legacy WSPs and invokes the T-WSP when it needs to handle 
security-sensitive data. ISO-WSP manages the flow of information such that sensitive in-
formation in plain-text format is only available to the T-WSP. The T-WSP and the U-WSP 
are then executed in separate protection domains, with the U-WSP being executed as a 
lower privilege process.  
The ISO-WSP architecture has three benefits: First, by limiting access of security-
sensitive information to components that need access, ISO-WSP addresses the PoLP prob-
lem. Secondly, only the T-WSP has to be tested or verified to ensure security of sensitive 
data. Since the T-WSP is expected to be smaller than the complete WSP, ISO-WSP re-
duces the size of the Trusted Components and makes exhaustive testing or formal verifica-
tion more feasible. Finally, by reusing the U-WSP to operate on non-sensitive or protected 
data, ISO-WSP also ensures that a majority of functionality expected from typical WSPs is 
retained. 
We first discuss the criteria for determining WSP components that require access to 
sensitive data. Next, we present the ISO-WSP architecture and discuss the interaction 
mechanism between the T-WSP and the U-WSP. Finally, we discuss how we limit the 
flow of sensitive information to the T-WSP, thereby negating the need to trust the U-WSP. 
3.1 Categorizing Components of WSPs 
Certain components of a WSP require access to plain-text security-sensitive data. Since 
these components have to be allowed to access or modify sensitive data, they have to be 
trusted by both the end-user and the business logic. We call such components Trusted 
Components and these components taken together are referred to as the T-WSP. The rest 
of the components do not have to be trusted and are henceforth referred to as untrusted 
components (and collectively referred to as the U-WSP).  
In our analysis, we assume that all security-sensitive information is protected using WS-
Security [5]. While the SSL and TLS protocols can be used to protect information, they 
are not always suited for web services because of the unique needs of web services, e.g., 
support for fine-grained encryption or signatures such as signing SOAP headers. Hence, 
we do not consider them in our analysis. 
Identifying the components of the T-WSP requires understanding of the various com-
ponents of the WSP and their corresponding functions. We relied on W3C’s architecture 
specification [9], specifications for the WS-* extensions such as WS-ReliableMessaging, 
WS-Addressing [4], and the Axis2 web services middleware architecture guide [2]. Based 
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on our analysis, we found that the security-related extensions such as WS-Security, WS-
Trust and WS-SecureConversation are the components of the WSP that have to be trusted. 
These components have to be trusted for one of two reasons:  
• They require access to sensitive contents of a message (Direct Access). WS-
Security implementations fall under this category as they need access to sensitive contents 
either to protect them (encrypt or sign) or to verify the protection on them (decrypt or ver-
ify signatures). 
• Or, they control behavior of components with direct access (Indirect Access). 
This includes other security specifications such as WS-Trust and WS-SecureConversation. 
The implementation of these specifications have to be trusted, even though they do not 
require access to sensitive data, as these components control WS-Security processing. A 
malicious implementation can subvert WS-Security processing, e.g., employ a weak en-
cryption key, to gain access to or leak sensitive information. 
The rest of the components of the WSP, including the WS-* extensions, are agnostic to 
message contents and can be treated as untrusted components. For example, the transport 
layer protocol implementation or SOAP implementation is agnostic to message contents as 
long as the contents confirm to the SOAP message format. However, there is a special 
class of untrusted components that requires access to sensitive data such as signature or 
encryption keys, albeit indirectly. WS-* extensions such as WS-Addressing recommend 
the use of WS-Security to protect the integrity and in some cases, the confidentiality of 
SOAP message headers. These extensions require the use of WS-Security and associated 
signature or encryption keys. Even though they are indirectly dependent on sensitive data, 
they do not require access to sensitive data, especially the contents of the message body. 
While these extensions are crucial to maintain the reliability and availability properties of 
web services, they do not affect the confidentiality and integrity of end-user data. There-
fore, we do not treat them as Trusted Components. 
3.2 Architecture of ISO-WSP 
Fig. 3 provides an overview of the architecture of ISO-WSP. As explained previously (§ 
3.1), implementation of security specifications form the T-WSP, and the rest of the com-
ponents form the U-WSP. In each case, the components are grouped together and executed 
as independent applications. In addition to the separation of components of the WSP, the 
configuration files and the application-level code too have to be classified and separated 
into two categories. Since the behavior of the security specifications can be controlled by 
configuration files, the corresponding configuration files also have to be trusted and se-
cured from access by untrusted components. 
We enforce separation between the T-WSP and the U-WSP by executing them in sepa-
rate protection domains, with the U-WSP running with lower privileges. This prevents U-
WSP from modifying the binaries or configuration files of the T-WSP. This separation 
also prevents U-WSP from accessing the secret keys used for encryption or decryption. 
However, separation alone does not prevent the flow of sensitive information to the U-
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WSP or to the untrusted parts of the application. The Message Splicer, to be discussed in 
Section 3.3, addresses how we secure the flow of sensitive information in the ISO-WSP. 
Section 4 discusses our approach of protecting the flow of sensitive information in the 
application-level code in detail. 
A legacy WSP can be converted to an ISO-WSP with a small number of modifications. 
After constructing a T-WSP, we have to modify the legacy WSP to invoke the T-WSP via 
remote invocation mechanisms instead of using local calls. This involves identifying pa-
rameters that are exchanged between the T-WSP and U-WSP, message and results of secu-
rity processing, and adding the necessary serializing and deserializing code. 
One of the main features of the ISO-WSP architecture is that external entities do not 
perceive any changes to the functional interface of the WSP. ISO-WSP exports the same 
external interface as legacy WSPs. The U-WSP provides support for the interface by im-
plementing transport-layer protocols such as HTTP over TCP/IP. 
Another key feature of ISO-WSP is that the U-WSP can still execute WS-Security li-
braries in its protection domain. However, to reiterate, the U-WSP cannot access the secret 
keys of the T-WSP. Therefore, any data encrypted with these keys is inaccessible to the U-
WSP. The U-WSP can use this feature along with weaker keys or keys with weaker secu-
rity guarantees to provide limited security guarantees. For example, one can envision a 
service provider maintaining two sets of secret keys: one to protect the confidentiality and 
integrity of sensitive data items from any attacks on the U-WSP and another to protect all 
types of data from snooping attacks on the network. Depending on the security require-
ments of the data items or client preferences, the service provider can choose the set of 
keys to employ. 
3.3 Securing Information Flow with the Message Splicer 
Before we discuss information flow security in ISO-WSP, we list the basic assumptions 
and features of ISO-WSP. First, we assume that all sensitive information is protected using 
 
Fig. 3. Architecture of ISO-WSP. Shaded boxes represent Trusted Components. Trusted Compo-
nents execute in a separate protection domain. 
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WS-Security. Furthermore, we assume that sensitive information protected using WS-
Security cannot be compromised without first compromising the security extensions. Sec-
ondly, WS-Security processing is carried out in a separate protection domain, with the U-
WSP being executed as a lower privilege process. Therefore, untrusted components cannot 
indirectly access sensitive data, e.g., they cannot change the parameters of security proc-
essing. We only have to prevent direct access of sensitive information by the U-WSP. 
We prevent direct access of sensitive information by the U-WSP by hiding sensitive in-
formation from it. ISO-WSP contains a Message Splicer
1
 whose function is to replace sen-
sitive data with dummy, non-sensitive data or vice versa. For an incoming message, the 
Message Splicer replaces sensitive data items with dummy data items and a token that 
uniquely identifies an instance of a sensitive data item and transfers the message to the U-
WSP. The token acts as a capability for the sensitive data item. The Message Splicer 
passes the sensitive information directly to the trusted part of the application. For an out-
going message, the Message Splicer accepts sensitive data from the trusted part of the ap-
plication and non-sensitive data from the U-WSP, composes them in a single message, and 
passes it on for security processing. Sensitive data items are protected (encrypted or 
signed) before being transferred to the untrusted WSP for further processing and transmis-
sion. This process is illustrated in Fig. 4. 
To analyze how this process of splitting and merging secures flow of sensitive informa-
tion in contrast to legacy WSPs, we divide the untrusted WSP into two categories: 
• Components that operate below WS-Security (WSP Processing–B in Fig. 4): Since 
these components worked on encrypted or signed data, they did not have direct access 
                                                          
1 Message Splicer is derived from Gene Splicing. Gene splicing is the process of creating recombi-
nant DNA by cutting and joining DNA sequences from multiple DNA fragments. 
 
Fig. 4. Securing Information Flow in ISO-WSP. The T-WSP replaces security-sensitive data items 
with protected data items or dummy data items before passing them on to the U-WSP. SFI is dis-
cussed in Section 4. 
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to sensitive data in legacy WSPs. However, they could indirectly compromise flows by 
modifying security processing parameters, e.g., overwrite configuration files or security 
processing parameters. In ISO-WSP, they execute with lower privilege and in a separate 
protection domain and hence, cannot manipulate security processing parameters. 
• Components that operate above WS-Security (WSP Processing–A in Fig. 4): These 
components had both direct and indirect access to sensitive data in legacy WSPs. In 
ISO-WSP, we replace sensitive data with dummy data items before transferring the 
message back to these components. Hence, these components are deprived of direct ac-
cess to sensitive data. Previously discussed arguments against indirect access by un-
trusted components are equally applicable to these components. 
4. Application support for ISO-WSP 
From the application developer’s point of view, ISO-WSP represents a departure from 
existing WSPs. The developer has to consciously split the application program into a 
trusted and an untrusted part. This is a potential drawback for the ISO-WSP architecture as 
the developer will have to expend additional effort while designing a new application. 
Additionally, legacy code can no longer be executed on ISO-WSP without appropriate 
modifications. In this section, we will show that the application developer only needs to 
carry out some simple steps to design a new application or port a legacy application to 
ISO-WSP. We will also see that these steps fit in naturally with security-aware design of 
web service applications. 
Modifications to the application level software can be classified into two types: modifi-
cations to data structures and modification to code. We capture these modifications by 
asking the application developer to define an interface, called the Secure Functional Inter-
face, to security-sensitive objects that can be used by untrusted components. We first de-
scribe this interface and then show how modifications to data structures and code can be 
easily effected with the help of this interface. We use Java as the application-level pro-
gramming language to illustrate the modifications to data and code. However, our ap-
proach is equally applicable to other object-oriented languages.  
4.1 Secure Functional Interface: A Restricted Interface for Remote Access 
To understand the need for defining a restricted interface for remote access of sensitive 
objects, consider a payment processing service as described in Listing 1-A (see last page). 
Of the data items, it is reasonable to expect that the customer would like to enforce strong 
confidentiality properties on the credit card information (Listing 1-B). In particular, the 
customer does not want the credit card information to be inappropriately stored or trans-
ferred. Object-oriented languages such as C++ and Java encapsulate data items, providing 
limited protection against inappropriate access. Even in such languages, sensitive objects 
contain functions that allow for retrieval of sensitive information, e.g., getter functions that 
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enable objects to be easily plugged into existing web service platforms (getCcNum in List-
ing 1-B). These methods can be invoked by untrusted objects to gain access to sensitive 
information. Therefore, we cannot export the complete list of methods supported by the 
sensitive object to the untrusted object.  
We require the application developer to identify sensitive data items and define a re-
stricted interface, called a Secure Functional Interface (SFI), for access by untrusted com-
ponents. The SFI for a sensitive data item lists all operations on the data item that can be 
performed by untrusted components. The SFI approach assumes that remote access func-
tion implementations are well-designed, i.e., a remote access function does not return sen-
sitive data to the caller or compromise the integrity of sensitive data. Listing 1-C presents 
the SFI for the CreditCard object, which no longer contains the getter functions, thereby 
denying access to sensitive information to the untrusted part of the application.   
Defining SFI is not an undue burden as current language-level features such as the pro-
tected and private keywords in function signatures already make the developers aware of 
security implications of the function. Defining a SFI is similar to the use of those key-
words; however, address-space separation between the trusted data items and untrusted 
components provides stronger security guarantees about information exchanges between 
them. 
Limitation. Currently, SFI only allows calls from untrusted part of the application to the 
trusted part of the application. We feel that this is not a major limitation as we can design 
an analogous interface (say, a Functional Interface for non-sensitive objects) to support 
calls from trusted part to the untrusted part. 
4.2 Modifications to Data Structures 
Based on our definition of SFI, one would assume that application-level data structures 
would be unmodified in ISO-WSP. However, as described in Section 3.3, we replace sen-
sitive data items with dummy items that contain tokens. Therefore we have to modify the 
corresponding application-level data structures to include a token field. On the untrusted 
side, we also have to add another field that holds the stub for invoking the remote proce-
dure on the trusted side. Adding these fields can be automated: add the fields to a class 
inherited from the class mentioned in the SFI file (Listing 1-E). We refer to this class as an 
annotated class. 
4.3 Modifications to Code 
First, by modifying the local application-level data structures, we are invalidating the 
schema for the web service interface (WSDL specification). Therefore, we have to modify 
the local application-level code to use the serializer/deserializer for the annotated class 
instead of the one for the legacy class. Crucially, the remote application-level code (a cli-
ent in the case the service provider uses an ISO-WSP or vice versa) does not have to be 
modified as the Message Splicer in the local ISO-WSP adds these new fields to an incom-
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ing XML message and strips the fields from an outgoing message. Once again, we can use 
the list of sensitive classes from SFI specifications to configure the Message Splicer to 
strip or add token information to messages. 
Secondly, when an untrusted component accesses functions specified in the SFI, it has 
to be converted into a remote call. This requires two modifications on the untrusted side: 
(a) parameters to the remote call have to be serializable. Most Java classes can be serial-
ized by adding “implements serializable” to the class definition. The default serialization 
methods along with automatically generated getters and setters are sufficient for serializing 
and deserializing most classes. Otherwise, the developer will have to write custom serial-
izers and deserializers. And (b), the untrusted classes have to be modified to call the re-
mote interface in case the sensitive data resides in the trusted part of the application. This 
is easily accomplished by modifying the relevant method to pass the arguments along with 
the token to the trusted part of the application. On the other hand, if the data resides in the 
untrusted part of the application, then the local method is invoked. 
At this point one should note that the untrusted part can modify itself to make a local 
call instead of a remote call. However, this would not affect the confidentiality or integrity 
of sensitive data, as the sensitive data is stored in the trusted part of the application.  
On the trusted side, we have to write a remote interface server that handles requests 
from the untrusted part. The server maintains a collection of security-sensitive objects, 
indexed by their unique identifiers. Upon receiving a request, the server uses the unique 
identifier to retrieve the appropriate instance of the sensitive object. It then makes a local 
call with the arguments provided by untrusted and returns the result. 
One potential weakness in the system is that the trusted part now performs operations 
using data provided by the untrusted part. This may violate the integrity flow in the system, 
as data is flowing from a lower integrity level (untrusted part) to a higher integrity level 
(trusted part). We assume that the trusted code validates all inputs from the untrusted part 
before proceeding with the operation, e.g., by comparing against a local copy. 
5. Implementation and Evaluation 
5.1 Implementation 
We implemented an ISO-WSP prototype based on the Apache Axis2 platform. The T-
WSP consisted of a WS-Security implementation (WSS4J [1]) and a Message Splicer. 
Accordingly, the configuration files for WS-Security also formed a part of the T-WSP. 
The rest of the Axis2 WSP, along with the other WS-* extensions formed the U-WSP. We 
modified Axis2 to make remote calls to perform WS-Security related processing. Since we 
used Java, all remote calls were Java RMI calls. This required around 100 new and modi-
fied lines of code (LOC). We also had to modify the WS-Security implementation to seri-
alize and deserialize the parameters. Since the WS-Security configuration files were now a 
part of the T-WSP, we had to add code to read the configuration files. In all, we had to 
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modify or add around 700 LOC. Thus, by adding or modifying around 800 LOC, we were 
able to convert the existing Axis2 WSP into an ISO-WSP prototype. 
We execute the T-WSP as a superuser process and the U-WSP as an unprivileged user. 
The file system permissions of the configuration files of the T-WSP are set such that the 
U-WSP is unable to read or modify them. 
Our implementation of the Message Splicer accepts information about sensitive classes 
in two ways. First, it allows developers to specify XML files that contain serialized ver-
sions of an instance of a sensitive data item with dummy values, e.g., a credit card data 
item with an invalid card number. The Message Splicer uses these “dummy” values when 
replacing sensitive objects in incoming messages. It also inserts unique tokens when re-
placing sensitive objects. Secondly, the Message Splicer accepts sensitive data items in the 
form of Document Object Model (DOM) fragments from the trusted part of the application. 
Each fragment possesses unique tokens that are used by the Message Splicer when replac-
ing dummy data items with actual content in outgoing messages. 
We implemented a simple payment processing service (described in Listing 1 in the last 
page) that accepts order information and payment information in the form of a credit card 
object and returns a confirmation string containing a transaction identifier and the amount 
charged to the card. We denoted the credit card information as security-sensitive informa-
tion. To protect this information, the client specifies that the whole request message be 
encrypted using WS-Security with the public key of the service provider as the encryption 
key. In our legacy service implementation, the business logic accepts a DOM fragment 
containing the input parameters and deserializes it into Java objects. Next, it calls the 
charge card function to generate a confirmation number. The results are converted into a 
DOM fragment which is then passed on to the WSP for further processing and transmis-
sion. 
In the implementation on top of ISO-WSP, the developer first specifies an SFI as illus-
trated in Listing 1-C. We then use our code generator to generate the necessary class files. 
On the untrusted side of the application, the developer has to modify the existing service in 
two places: First the developer has to use the serializer/deserializer for the annotated secu-
rity-sensitive classes. This involves modifying 20 lines of code. Secondly, the developer 
has to add a call to the cleanup function of the credit card class, so that the trusted object 
can be freed after request processing. On the trusted side of the application, the developer 
has to add code to interface with the T-WSP (about 10 LOC). With these modifications, 
the legacy service can now run on the ISO-WSP implementation. 
For an incoming request, both the trusted part and the untrusted part of the application 
receive DOM fragments, which are deserialized into Java classes. The trusted part regis-
ters itself with a Credit Card server that is executing on the T-WSP. The untrusted applica-
tion calls the charge card function using the SFI. Hence, the call is redirected to the Credit 
Card server on the trusted side (Listing 1-F), which in turn invokes the charge card func-
tion of the appropriate instance of the credit card class. Once the untrusted part gets the 
confirmation number, it invokes the cleanup method to free the credit card object in the 
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trusted part of the application. Finally, the results are converted into a DOM fragment and 
passed on to the U-WSP. 
5.2 Performance of ISO-WSP 
Our experimental setup consisted of two machines, each with Pentium-4 3.0 GHz proces-
sors with 1 GB RAM, running Linux kernel 2.6.15. The machines were connected via a 
100 MBps switch. We used Axis2 version 1.1 and WSS4J version 1.5.1 running on top of 
Apache Tomcat 4.1.31.  
There are three sources of overhead in the ISO-WSP. First, since the security-sensitive 
parts of the WSP and application are separated from the rest of the application, there is the 
added cost of remote calls. Related to this is the cost of serializing and deserializing data 
items for remote calls. Finally, there is the cost of performing message splicing operations. 
To estimate the RMI overhead, we use a simple echo application with the client and 
server running on the same machine. Round trip times increased linearly with message 
sizes, at the rate of about 0.5 ms per kilobyte. For message sizes less than 8 KB, round trip 
time was less than 1 millisecond which is negligible when compared to typical web service 
response times which are of the order of hundreds of milliseconds [16]. 
In the ISO-WSP architecture, we have to transfer SOAP messages between the U-WSP 
and the T-WSP. This involves converting SOAP messages in DOM format to byte array 
format and vice versa. To estimate these costs, we used an XML data set from the 
XMLBench Document Model Benchmark [10]. We evaluated the cost of serializing and 
deserializing the DOM representation of the data set for two XML parsers, the AXIOM 
pull parser used in the Axis2 WSP (and the U-WSP) and the default Xerces parser con-
figuration used in the T-WSP. At this point, we want to reiterate that we only want an es-
timate of the costs of serializing and deserializing SOAP messages. We are not attempting 
to rigorously analyze the performance of the XML parser. For the data set, we found that 
combined serializing and deserializing costs for small to medium sized XML files (~10 
kilobytes) to be less than 4 ms. However, the combined costs for the largest XML file in 
the dataset (36 KB) was about 14 ms. We omit detailed results due to space limitations. 
We do not perform similar microbenchmarks for estimating message splicing costs and 
application-level serializing and deserializing costs because they are closely dependent on 
the application-level data structures. Rather, we measure these costs as a part of a concrete 
web service implementation. 
We use the payment processing web service described earlier (§ 5.1) to evaluate the 
end-to-end overhead imposed by the ISO-WSP architecture. We found that using ISO-
WSP increased the average response time from 40.3 ms to 47.9 ms. To accurately charac-
terize the overheads imposed by ISO-WSP, we also measured the time spent in each stage 
of the ISO-WSP and the results are presented in Fig. 5. We see that the overhead of the 
additional stages is about 8.8 ms. However, the ISO-WSP implementation as a whole is 
only 5.2 ms slower than the Axis2 WSP. We found that this is because the Axis2 WSP 
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uses the pull-based AXIOM parser whereas the T-WSP in our implementation uses the 
default Xerces parser configuration. Since WS-Security processing typically involves pars-
ing the whole message (for full message signatures or encryption), the performance of 
WS-Security with pull-based parsers suffers. However, as expected, the AXIOM parser is 
faster when serializing and deserializing SOAP messages. 
The rest of the costs (~ 2.4 ms) are distributed in the application-level code. These in-
clude the cost for two RMI calls from the untrusted part to the trusted part (~0.8 ms): one 
for charging the credit card and another for cleaning up the state in the trusted part. The 
second major cost arises because the SOAP message now has to be additionally deserial-
ized on the trusted side (~1.5 ms). 
Based on the microbenchmarks and the results for the payment processing web service, 
we can see that ISO-WSP introduces overheads of the order of a few milliseconds. While 
this might seem excessive, typical web service invocation time ranges from 0.5 seconds to 
a few seconds [16]. More importantly, one should note that ISO-WSP is invoked only dur-
ing the exchange of sensitive information. When exchanging non-sensitive information, 
ISO-WSP still uses the legacy WSP, thereby maintaining the performance of the legacy 
WSP.  
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 3.2, ISO-WSP is designed such that WS-Security 
processing can still be performed in the U-WSP. Ideally, the service provider would pro-
vide stronger security guarantees when the T-WSP is involved (e.g., protection from po-
tential compromise of large U-WSP). By careful design of web service interfaces, ex-
change of sensitive information can be separated from performance critical operations. For 
example, a real-time stock quote service can export two interfaces: an authentication inter-
face that accepts an account password and returns a session identifier and a querying inter-
face that accepts the session identifier and returns stock quotes. And instead of providing a 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of security processing costs for an incoming message. All numbers in microsec-
onds. Numbers in parentheses indicate the 95% confidence interval. 
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single public key, the service provider exports two public keys: one for the authentication 
interface (AI key) and another for the querying interface (QI key). Since the authentication 
interface involves exchange of account password, this stage is processed using the AI key 
and the T-WSP. Once account password has been validated, information exchanges for 
retrieving quotes can be carried out using the QI key and the U-WSP, thereby limiting the 
performance impact of ISO-WSP.  
5.3 Security Properties of ISO-WSP 
In Section 3.3, we discussed how ISO-WSP limits flow of sensitive information to 
components that need access, thereby addressing PoLP issues at the component level. To 
recap, the T-WSP consists of components that require either direct or indirect access to 
sensitive data. We augment the T-WSP with a Message Splicer, which replaces sensitive 
data with dummy data items before releasing the message to the U-WSP. Therefore the T-
WSP only releases protected (encrypted or signed) sensitive data to the untrusted part. 
Moreover, since we execute the T-WSP in a separate protection domain, the U-WSP can-
not interfere with the processing in the T-WSP.   
Our second motivating factor for constructing an ISO-WSP was the increased complex-
ity of WSPs. Table 2 compares the software complexity of various WSP components and 
compares them against the T-WSP. We measured two properties: Source Lines of Code 
and McCabe’s Cyclomatic complexity [18]. Empirical studies have shown that both meas-
ures of software complexity correlate with number of bugs in code [19]. We see that the T-
WSP is a factor of 5 smaller and simpler than the current implementation of the Axis2 
WSP, making the T-WSP more amenable to exhaustive testing. The small size of the T-
WSP also makes it easier to apply static analysis techniques for monitoring the flow of 
information, as described in [21].  
Extensibility of WSPs is a crucial factor in testing and analysis. Since extensions can 
change the behavior of WSPs and since they can be added or configured at run time, they 
complicate the testing process. However, extensions provide useful functionality such as 
support for addressing, transactions and reliability. By extracting a T-WSP and retaining 
the functionality of the legacy U-WSP, ISO-WSP attempts to gain the best of both worlds. 
By limiting extensibility and configurability in the T-WSP, ISO-WSP ensures that the test-
ing process is simplified for T-WSP. And by retaining functionality in the U-WSP, ISO-
Table 2. Comparison of Source Lines of Code (SLOC) and McCabe's Cyclomatic Complexity 
(MCC) of the T-WSP and the Axis2 WSP along with its extensions. Extensions include imple-
mentations of WS-Coordination, WS-ResourceFramework, WS-Addressing, amongst others. All 
numbers were generated using the JavaNCSS tool [3].  
Module Axis2 Extensions WS-Security WSP-Total T-WSP 
SLOC 23,580 70,350 16,900 110,830 19,360 
MCC 7,930 24,100 5,180 39,210 6,050 
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WSP ensures that developers will still be able to use and configure extensions according to 
their needs. 
Limitations. We would like to note that the ISO-WSP is vulnerable to Denial of Service 
attacks, wherein the U-WSP either corrupts messages or does not invoke the T-WSP for 
security processing. While this affects the availability of the service, it does not compro-
mise the confidentiality or integrity of security-sensitive information. 
ISO-WSP can be enhanced with Trusted Computing hardware [8] and application level 
support for Trusted Computing, e.g, Integrity Measurement Architecture [22], to provide 
additional, desirable security properties such as integrity of software stack at load time and 
remote attestation.  
6. Related Work 
Previous efforts have addressed refactoring existing systems software [11,15] and ap-
plication-level software [24] to reduce the size and complexity of software that has access 
to sensitive data. Our work can be considered as an application of such techniques to web 
services middleware. In contrast to previous approaches, by replacing sensitive data items 
with dummy data items in the middleware, we also enable existing application-level soft-
ware to run with minimal modifications. 
There is also considerable research into refactoring and customizing middleware to 
modularize and simplify them. Zhang et al. [30,31] and  Eichberg et al. [13] use Aspect 
Oriented Programming techniques to modularize middleware and then, customize it ac-
cording to the needs of applications. OpenCOM [12] and CompOSE/Q [26], amongst oth-
ers, are examples of reflective middleware that allow for customization of middleware to 
suit the needs of application. ISO-WSP is an attempt at refactoring middleware with secu-
rity as the driving factor. Techniques described in [30,31] are applicable to the construc-
tion of ISO-WSP.  
Trusted Computing initiatives [8] attempt to reassure remote entities about the integrity 
of the software stack handling sensitive data. The Integrity Measurement architecture [22] 
aims to extend integrity measurement to include configuration files. WS-Attestation [29] 
and Trusted Web Services [25] attempt to incorporate Trusted Computing principles into 
the web services stack. However, an attacker can still compromise the integrity of the 
software stack by exploiting run time vulnerabilities or by loading malicious extensions at 
runtime. By reducing the size and complexity of the trusted part of the system, ISO-WSP 
enables the use of exhaustive testing or static analysis techniques, thereby reducing the 
number of run-time vulnerabilities.  
The use of static analysis techniques [14,27] to identify bugs in code is gaining popular-
ity. For strongly-typed languages such as Java, one can go even further and apply lan-
guage-based information flow protection techniques [21]. However, the applicability of 
such techniques to a large code-base is a subject of open research and we expect such 
techniques to be more amenable to smaller code bases, such as that of the T-WSP. 
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Lastly, tokens used in ISO-WSP by untrusted applications to operate on security-
sensitive data can be viewed as capabilities [28]. The ISO-WSP architecture can be con-
sidered as retrofitting a capability-based architecture in to WSPs. Protected Data Paths 
(PDP) [17] uses a similar approach to hide sensitive information from untrusted applica-
tion level programs. PDP consists of kernel-level modules that traps I/O calls retrieving 
sensitive data and replaces sensitive data with tokens, thereby preventing application level 
programs from directly accessing them. ISO-WSP not only adds tokens, but it also sends 
back dummy data items with similar structure to the sensitive data item, thereby minimiz-
ing the changes to existing applications. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented ISO-WSP, a secure middleware architecture to counter the 
problem of large and complex WSPs. ISO-WSP consisted of two parts: a small, trusted T-
WSP that required access to security-sensitive information and a large and complex U-
WSP that retained the features of legacy WSPs. By limiting the flow of sensitive informa-
tion to the T-WSP, we ensured that the U-WSP does not have to be trusted, thereby im-
proving the testability of the ISO-WSP. We also provided end-to-end support for ISO-
WSP by splitting existing applications based on a Secure Functional Interface (SFI) to 
security-sensitive objects. Using a developer-specified SFI, we generated code that de-
composed legacy applications into trusted and untrusted parts, thereby enabling it to run 
on top of ISO-WSP. 
We demonstrated the feasibility of our approach by building an ISO-WSP based on the 
Apache Axis2 WSP. We showed that ISO-WSP reduced the software complexity of the 
trusted part by a factor of 5, while imposing a manageable overhead of a few milliseconds 
per request. We also showed that legacy applications can be ported to run on the ISO-
WSP with few tens of lines of new and modified code. 
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Listing 1. Partial Code Listing for a Payment Processing Service. Boxed area indicates modifica-
tions specified by developer. Highlighted areas indicate code reuse. 
/* Getters and Setters for sfiID*/ 
 
/* Initialize Stub */ 
private void initStub(){ ... } 
  
/* override the methods defined  
   in interface */ 
public String chargeCard(float amnt){ 
  if(sfiID != null){ 
 initStub(); 
 return stub.chargeCard(sfiID, 
amnt);  
  }else{ 
 /* Non Sensitive Object  
    Call superclass method*/ 
 return super.chargeCard(amnt); 
  }  
  } 
} 
 
F)Generated Code on Trusted Side 
 
public class RemoteCCSfiServer  
               implments CCsfi{ 
/*Store ref to CC*/ 
static Hashtable ht; 
/*Add Entry to hashtable*/ 
public static void add(String id,  
             CreditCardTrust cc){ 
  ht.add(id, cc); 
} 
/* Init Remote Interface */ 
public static void initRI() {...} 
 
/* Handle remote Calls */ 
public String chargeCard(String 
        sfiID, float amount){ 
   CreditCardTrust cc =  
    (CreditCardTrust)ht.get(sfiID); 
   if(cc != null) 
     return cc.chargeCard(amount); 
   return “INVALID”; 
} 
} 
public class CreditCardTrust extends  
                        CreditCard{ 
private String sfiID; 
 
public void setSfiID(String id){ 
  RemoteCCSfiServer.add(id, this); 
  sfiID = id; 
} 
/* Other functions */... 
} 
A)Web Service Port 
PPResults ProcessPayment (OrderInfo ord, 
CustomerInfo cinf, CreditCard cc); 
 
B)Class Definitions 
public class CreditCard{ 
private String ccNum, Name, zip; 
private int expiryMon, expiryYr; 
/* Getters,Setters */ 
public String getCcNum(){...} 
public void setCcNum(String num){.} 
/* Other getters, setters*/... 
/*Charge Card and return a Txn ID*/ 
public String chargeCard(float 
                 amount) {...} 
/* Validate Card*/ 
public boolean validate(){...} 
/* Additional Functions */ ... 
} 
 
Modifications Specified by Developer 
C)SFI Definition 
/* Classname and Namespace*/ 
class:=edu.gatech.cc.pp.CreditCard 
ns:=http://pp.com/CreditCard 
/* Interface */ 
interface CCsfi{ 
String chargeCard(float amount); 




public interface CCsfi{ 
public String chargeCard(String         
sfiID, float amount); 
public boolean validate(String  
                sfiID); 
public void cleanup(String sfiID); 
} 
 
E)Generated Code on Untrusted Side 
public class CreditCardUnt  
          extends CreditCard{ 
  private String sfiID; 
private CCsfi stub = null; 
